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1. Introduction
Most modern block and stream ciphers can be expressed as certain arrangement of Vector
Boolean Functions. Thus, in the context of block and stream ciphers’ design (mainly in S-boxes
and combining functions respectively), it is essential to define criteria which measure the
cryptographic strength of Boolean Functions and Vector Boolean Functions. Ideally, some
of the following requirements must be fulfilled by this criteria:
1. The principles of confusion and diffusionmust be enforced by the criterion Shannon (1949).
Confusion obscures the relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext Schneier
(1995). Difussion dissipates the redundancy of the plaintext by spreading it over the
ciphertext. Both techniques make more difficult for a cryptanalyst to find out redundancy
and statistical patterns in the ciphertext.
2. The criterion must be expressed in terms of a distance to an appropriate set S of
cryptographically weak functions Meier & Staffelbach (1990). Functions that exhibit
properties common to cryptographically weak functions are also considered to be
cryptographically weak.
3. The criterion should remain invariant under a certain group of transformations Meier
& Staffelbach (1990). This symmetry group should contain the group of affine
transformations.
A function is considered to be cryptographically weak if it is easily breakable or it can be
turned into a weak function by means of simple (e.g. linear or affine) transformations.
This definition is congruent with the notion of similar secrecy introduced by Shannon in
Shannon (1949), so that two functions R and S are said to be "similar" if there exists a fixed
transformation A, with an inverse A−1, such that R = AS. Hereunder are described the best
known cryptographically weak functions.
• Linear and affine functions. These functions are easily breakable because the simultaneous
complementation of a subset of the input variables causes the value of a linear or an affine
function to always change (from the original value before complementation) or to never
change.
• Functions with non-zero linear structures. The cryptanalytic value of linear structures
lies in their potential to map a nonlinear function to a degenerate function via a linear
transformation, which may reduce the size of the keyspace.
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• Functions not balanced. The output of these kind of functions are not uniformly
distributed, avoiding statistical dependence between the input and the output (which can
be used in attacks).
• Functions with low algebraic degree can be approximated by low complex functions
easing their attack.
• m-th order correlation-immune functions are those whose output distribution probability
are unaltered when any m (or, equivalently, at most m) of the inputs are kept constant.
• Functions with low degree of Propagation Criterion has little diffusion property and
their output distribution probability are altered when some coordinates of the input are
complemented.
The main objective of this chapter is to characterize the more relevant cryptographic criteria
(nonlinearity, linear distance, balancedness, algebraic degree, correlation immunity, resiliency
and propagation criterion) for constructions of Vector Boolean Functions such as composition,
addition of coordinate functions, direct sum and bricklayering, from the knowledge of their
components. The study of these functions are relevant in cryptology due to the strong
connection between cryptographic attacks on the one hand and cryptographic properties of
these building blocks on the other hand. In most cases, the security against a particular class
of attack can be expressed by the existence of a certain property of the Vector Boolean function,
which results in a measure of security against that class of attacks:
• Linear cryptanalysis is based on the idea of finding high probable linear or affine relations
between the inputs and outputs of S-boxes present in the cipher, that is, finding S-boxes
with low nonlinearity Matsui (1994).
• Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack based on the idea of finding high
probable differentials pairs between the inputs and outputs of S-boxes present in the
cipher, that is, finding S-boxes with low linearity distance. Differential cryptanalysis Biham
& Shamir (1991) can be seen as an extension of the ideas of attacks based on the presence
of linear structures Nyberg (1991).
• Distinguishing attacks are able to distinguish the pseudorandom sequence from a random
sequence by observing that the distribution of the sequences is not uniform for not
balanced functions.
• Jakobsen and Knudsen identified interpolation attacks on block ciphers with S-boxes
having small algebraic degree Jakobsen & Knudsen (1997). Later Canteaut and Videau
provided Higher order differential attacks which exploit the fact that the algebraic degree
of the S-box is low. In the case of combining functions, the sequence produced by n
combined LSFRs can be obtained by a single LSFR.
• For the pseudo-random generators, the best known cryptanalytic technique is the
correlation attack, which is based on the idea of finding correlation between the outputs
and the inputs, that is, finding S-boxes with low resiliency.
• Propagation Characteristic (PC) is an important cryptographic property for S-boxes to
resist differential cryptanalysis. To get uniform output distribution, S-boxes in block
ciphers should have PC(l) of higher order for l ≥ 1.
52 Cryptography and Security in Computing
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2. Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions
Let < GF(2),+, · > be the finite field of order 2, where GF(2) = Z2 = {0, 1}, ’+’ the ’integer
addition modulo 2’ and ’·’ the ’integer multiplication modulo 2’. Vn is the vector space of
n-tuples of elements from GF(2). The direct sum of x ∈ Vn1 and y ∈ Vn2 is defined as
x⊕ y = (x1, . . . , xn1 , y1, . . . , yn2 ) ∈ Vn1+n2 . The inner product of x, y ∈ Vn is denoted by x · y,
and of real vectors x, y ∈ Rn is denoted by 〈x, y〉. Let x, y ∈ Rn, the pointwise product is
defined as x  y = (x1 · y1, . . . , xn · yn).
f : Vn → GF(2) is called a Boolean function and Fn is the set of all Boolean functions on Vn.
Ln is the set of all linear Boolean functions on Vn: Ln = {lu ∀ u ∈ Vn | lu(x) = u · x} and
An is the set of all affine Boolean functions on Vn. The directional derivative of f ∈ Fn in the
direction of u ∈ Vn is defined by ∆u f (x) = f (x + u) + f (x), x ∈ Vn. If the following equality
is satisfied: ∆u f (x) = c, c ∈ GF(2) ∀ x ∈ Vn then u ∈ Vn is called a linear structure of f .
The real-valued mapping χu(x) = (−1)∑
i=n
i=1 ui xi = (−1)u·x for x,u ∈ Vn is called a character.
The character form of f ∈ Fn is defined as χ f (x) = (−1) f (x). The truth table of χ f is called
as the (1,−1)-sequence vector or sequence vector of f and is denoted by ξ f ∈ R2
n
. In other
words: ξ f = TØf = ((−1)
f (α0), (−1) f (α1), . . . , (−1) f (α2n−1)).
Let two real functions ϕ,ψ : Vn → R , the circular convolution or cross-correlation (ϕ ∗ ψ) :
Vn → R is defined by: (ϕ ∗ ψ)(x) = ∑u∈Vn ϕ(u)ψ(x + u).
F : Vn → Vm, F(x) = ( f1(x), . . . , fm(x)) is called a Vector Boolean function and Fn,m is the
set of all Vector Boolean functions F : Vn → Vm. Each fi : Vn → GF(2) ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is a
coordinate function of F. The indicator function of F ∈ Fn,m, denoted by θF : Vn ×Vm → R,
is defined in Chabaud & Vaudenay (1994) as θF(x, y) = 1 if y = F(x) and θF(x, y) = 0 if
y 
= F(x). The character form of (u, v) ∈ Vn × Vm can be defined as follows: χ(u,v)(x, y) =
(−1)u·x+v·y.
Let F ∈ Fn,m and u ∈ Vn, then the difference Vector Boolean function of F in the direction of
u ∈ Vn, denoted by ∆uF ∈ Fn,m is defined as follows: ∆uF(x) = F(x + u) + F(x), x ∈ Vn. If
the following equality is satisfied: ∆uF(x) = c, c ∈ Vn ∀ x ∈ Vn then u ∈ Vn is called a linear
structure of F.
We define the simplifying notation for the maximum of the absolute values of a set of real
numbers {auv}u,v, characterized by vectors u and v, as: max (auv) = max(u,v) {|auv|}.
Using the same simplifying notation, we define the
∗
max (·) operator on a set of real numbers
{auv}u,v, as:
∗
max (auv) = max(u,v) 
=(0,0){|auv|}.
2.2 Constructions of Vector Boolean Functions
In this chapter, some secondary contructions are studied, which build (n,m) variable Vector
Boolean Functions from (n′,m′) variable ones (with n′ ≤ n,m′ ≤ m). The direct sum
construction has been used to construct resilient and bent Boolean functions Carlet (2004),
Maitra & Pasalic (2002), Pasalic et al. (2001), Sarkar &Maitra (2000a), Sarkar &Maitra (2000b).
Adding coordinate functions and bricklayering are operations used to build modern ciphers
such as CAST Adams & Tavares (1993), DES Des (1977) and AES Daemen & Rijmen (2002).
5ryptographic Cri eria o  Vector Boolean Functions
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2.2.1 Direct sum
Definition 1. Let n = n1 + n2, n1, n2 ≥ 1,m ≥ 1, F1 ∈ Fn1,m and F2 ∈ Fn2,m. The direct sum of
F1 and F2 is the function:
(F1 ⊕ F2) : Vn1 ×Vn2 → Vm
(x, y) → (F1 ⊕ F2)(x, y) = F1(x) + F2(y)
(1)
This is a generalization for Vector Boolean functions of the construction of Boolean functions
first introduced in Rothaus (1976).
2.2.2 Adding coordinate functions
Definition 2. Let n ≥ 1,m = m1 + m2,m1,m2 ≥ 1 and F ∈ Fn,m1 and G ∈ Fn,m2 . The result of
adding coordinate functions of F and G is the function:
(F,G) : Vn → Vm1 ×Vm2
x → (F,G)(x) = ( f1(x), . . . , fm1 (x), g1(x), . . . , gm2 (x))
(2)
This is a generalization for Vector Boolean functions of the method used in the CAST
algorithm and studied in Nyberg (1995) by adding more than one coordinate function at the
same time.
2.2.3 Bricklayer
Definition 3. Let n = n1 + n2, n1, n2 ≥ 1,m = m1 + m2,m1,m2 ≥ 1, F ∈ Fn1,m1 and G ∈ Fn2,m2 .
The Bricklayer of F and G is the function F|G ∈ Fn,m:
F|G : Vn1 ×Vn2 → Vm1 ×Vm2
(x, y) → F|G(x, y) = ( f1(x), . . . , fm1 (x), g1(y), . . . , gm2 (y))
(3)
This construction corresponds to the bricklayer function Daemen & Rijmen (2002) as a parallel
application of a number of Vector Boolean functions operating on smaller inputs.
Another interesting operation is the restriction o projection of a Vector Boolean Function,
which can be found in ciphers such as MacGuffin Blaze & Schneier (1995).
2.2.4 Projection
Definition 4. Let F ∈ Fn,m and ordered set A = {i1, . . . , ip} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. The result of projecting
F onto A is the function:
F|A : Vn → Vp
x → F|A(x) = ( fi1 (x), . . . , fip (x))
(4)
2.3 Walsh spectrum, autocorrelation spectrum and differential profile
The Walsh and Autocorrelation Spectrum together with the Differential Profile of the Vector
Boolean Functions conforming a cipher play an important role. The cryptograhic criteria
nonlinearity, resiliency, balancedness, linearity distance and propagation criteria can be
obtained from these three matrices.
54 Cryptography and Security in Computing
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Definition 5. Let a Boolean function f ∈ Fn, the Walsh Transform of f at u ∈ Vn is the
n-dimensional Discrete Fourier Transform and can be calculated as follows:
W f (u) = χˆ f (u) =
〈
ξ f , ξlu
〉
= ∑
x∈Vn
χ f (x)χu(x) = ∑
x∈Vn
(−1) f (x)+ux (5)
The Walsh Spectrum of f can be represented by a matrix whose rows are characteristiced
by u ∈ Vn in lexicographic order, denoted by WS( f ) ∈ M2n×1(R) and defined as WS( f ) =(
χˆ f (ff0) . . . χˆ f (u) . . . χˆ f (ff2n−1)
)T
where χˆ f (u) = WS( f )(u) and satisfying that −2n ≤
χˆ f (u) ≤ 2n.
The following fundamental result can be seen as an extension of the usual Fourier Transform
properties:
Theorem 1. ∀ f , g ∈ Fn it holds that:
ξ f  ξg
W
←→ 12n WS( f ) ∗WS(g) (6)
Proof.
W {ξ f  ξg}(u) = ∑x∈Vn (ξ f  ξg)(x)χu(x) = ∑x∈Vn χ f (x)χg(x)χu(x)
= ∑x∈Vn
(
1
2n ∑v∈Vn χˆ f (v)χv(x)
)
χg(x)χu(x)
= 12n ∑v∈Vn χˆ f (v)∑x∈Vn χv(x)χg(x)χu(x)
= 12n ∑v∈Vn χˆ f (v)∑x∈Vn χg(x)χu+v(x)
= 12n ∑v∈Vn χˆ f (v)χˆg(u + v) =
1
2n (WS( f ) ∗WS(g))(u)
Theorem 2. Let u ∈ Vn,u1 ∈ Vn1 ,u2 ∈ Vn2 , n = n1 + n2 so that u = u1 ⊕ u2. Let f1 ∈ Fn1 and
f2 ∈ Fn2 , their direct sum f1 ⊕ f2 ∈ Fn, and it satisfies: χˆ f1⊕ f2 (u) = χˆ f1 (u1) · χˆ f2 (u2) Sarkar &
Maitra (2000a).
Definition 6. Let the Vector Boolean function F ∈ Fn,m, its Walsh Transform is the two-dimensional
Walsh Transform defined by:
WF(u, v) = θˆF(u, v) = ∑
x∈Vn
∑
y∈Vm
θF(x, y)χ(u,v)(x, y) = ∑
x∈Vn
(−1)ux+vF(x) (7)
Corollary 1. The value of the Walsh transform of Vector Boolean function F ∈ Fn,m at (u, v)
coincides with the value of the Walsh transform of the Boolean function v · F at u: θˆF(u, v) =
χˆv·F(u) ∀ (u, v) ∈ Vn ×Vm.
The Walsh Spectrum of F can be represented by a matrix whose rows are characteristiced by
u ∈ Vn and whose columns are characteristiced by v ∈ Vm in lexicographic order, denoted
by WS(F) ∈ M2n×2m (R). It holds that θˆF(u, v) = WS(F)(u, v), WS(F)u is the row of the
Walsh Spectrum characteristiced by u and WS(F)v is the column of the Walsh Sprectrum
characteristiced by v.
5ryptographic Cri eria o  Vector Boolean Functions
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Theorem 3. Let LA,b ∈ Fn,m an affine Vector Boolean function where LA,b(x) = Ax + b with
A ∈ Mn×m(GF(2)) and b ∈ Vm, its spectrum holds that Pommerening (2005):
θˆLA,b (u, v) =
⎧⎨
⎩
2n if vTA = uT , vTb = 0
−2n if vTA = uT , vTb = 1
0 if vTA 
= uT
Theorem 4. If F ∈ Fn,n is bijective then it holds that: θˆF(u, v) = θˆF−1 (v,u).
Definition 7. The autocorrelation of f ∈ Fn with respect to the shift u ∈ Vn is the cross-correlation
of f with itself, denoted by r f (u) : Vn → R and defined by:
r f (u) =
1
2n ∑
x∈Vn
χ f (x)χ f (x + u) =
1
2n ∑
x∈Vn
(−1) f (x)+ f (u+x) (8)
Definition 8. The autocorrelation of F ∈ Fn,m with respect to the shift (u, v) ∈ Vn × Vm is the
cross-correlation of F with itself, denoted by rF(u, v) : Vn ×Vm → R, so that Nyberg (1995):
rF(u, v) = 12n ∑x∈Vn χvF(x + u)χvF(x) =
1
2n ∑x∈Vn (−1)
vF(x+u)+vF(x) (9)
Let F ∈ Fn,m, if we denote by DF(u, v) the set of vectors where the difference Vector
Boolean function of F in the direction of u ∈ Vn coincides with v ∈ Vm by: DF(u, v) =
{x ∈ Vn | ∆uF(x) = v}.
Let F ∈ Fn,m where n ≥ m. The matrix containing all posible values of #DF(u, v) is referred
to as its XOR or Differential Distribution Table. Let DU(F) be the largest value in differential
distribution table of F (not counting the first element in the first row), namely,
DU(F) = max
(u,v) 
=(0,0)
#DF(u, v) = max
(u,v) 
=(0,0)
# {x ∈ Vn | ∆uF(x) = v} (10)
Then F is said to be differentially DU(F)-uniform, and accordingly, DU(F) is called the
differential uniformity of F J. Seberry & Zheng (1994). By normalizing the elements of the
differential distribution table we obtain the Differential profile:
Definition 9. Let the function δF : Vn ×Vm → Q δF(u, v) = 12n #DF(u, v), then the Differential
Profile of F can be represented by a matrix whose rows are characterized by u ∈ Vn and whose
columns are characterized by v ∈ Vm in lexicographic order, denoted by DP(F) ∈ M2n×2m (R) where
δF(ffi, ffj) with i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n − 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2m − 1}.
Definition 10. The maximum value of δF(u, v) is called the differential potential of F: dp(F) =
max {δF(u, v) | ∀ u ∈ Vn, v ∈ Vm, (u, v) 
= (0, 0)}.
Let F ∈ Fn,m then 12m ≤ dp(F) ≤ 1 and the lower bound holds if and only if F is bent and
the upper bound is reached when F is linear or affine. The differential uniformity of F ∈ Fn,m
and its differential potential are related as follows: dp(F) = 12n DU(F). The differential profile
at (u, v) is related with the autocorrelation in the same point in the following way Nyberg
(1995): δF(u, v) = 12n+m ∑w∈Vm rF(u,w)χv(w).
56 Cryptography and Security in Computing
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3. Characteristics
The resistance of the cryptosystems to the known attacks can be quantified through some
fundamental characteristics of the Vector Boolean functions used in them. In this chapter,
we consider the characteristics most commonly employed for the design of cryptographic
functions present in modern block and stream ciphers.
3.1 Nonlinearity
Definition 11. The nonlinearity of the Boolean function f ∈ Fn is a characteristic defined as
the distance to the nearest affine function as follows: NL( f ) = minau∈An d( f , au) = 2
n−1 −
1
2 maxu∈Vn |χˆ f (u)| Meier & Staffelbach (1990).
Definition 12. The nonlinearity of a Vector Boolean function F ∈ Fn,m is defined as the minimum
among the nonlinearities of all nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F Nyberg
(1993):
NL(F) = min
v 
=0∈Vm
NL(v · F) = 2n−1 −
1
2
∗
max (WS(F)(u, v)) (11)
Alternatively, and also associated with the cardinality of the sets of values for which F ∈ Fn,m
satisfies any given linear relation parametrized by (u, v) we can define the linear potential of
F ∈ Fn,m as lp(F) = 122n ·
∗
max (WS(F)(u, v)2)which is also exploited as a measure of linearity
in linear cryptanalysis, and satisfies Chabaud & Vaudenay (1994) 12n ≤ lp(F) ≤ 1 so that the
lower bound holds if and only if F has maximum nonlinearity (F is bent) and the upper bound
is reached when F is linear or affine.
3.2 Linearity distance
Definition 13. The linearity distance of the Vector Boolean function F ∈ Fn,m is defined as the
minimum among the linearity distances of all nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions
of F:
LD(F) = min
v 
=0∈Vm
LD(v · F) = 2n−1 · min
u 
=0∈Vn,v 
=0∈Vm
{δF(u, v)} (12)
Definition 14. The linearity distance can be expressed in terms of the differential potential as follows:
LD(F) = 2n−1 · (1− dp(F)) = 2n−1 ·
(
1−
∗
max (DP(F))
)
Pommerening (2005).
3.3 Balancedness
Definition 15. f ∈ Fn is balanced if its output is uniformly distributed over GF(2) satisfying
χˆ f (0) = 0.
Definition 16. F ∈ Fn,m is balanced (or to have balanced output) if each possible output m-tuple
occurs with equal probability 12m , that is, its output is uniformly distributed in Vm. This is equivalent
to say that for every y ∈ Vm:
#{x ∈ Vn | F(x) = y} = 2n−m ←→ θˆF(0, v) = 0, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vm (13)
5ryptographic Cri eria o  Vector Boolean Functions
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3.4 Correlation immunity
Definition 17. f ∈ Fn is called correlation-immune of order t (t-CI) if for every subset
{i1, i2, . . . , it} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, f is statistically independent of (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xit ), satisfying Xiao &
Massey (1988): χˆ f (u) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ t. f can also be denoted as (n, 1, t)-CI function.
Definition 18. F ∈ Fn,m is an (n,m, t)-CI function if and only if every nonzero linear combination
f (x) = ∑mi=1 vi fi(x) of coordinate functions of F is an (n, 1, t)-CI function, where x ∈ Vn, vi ∈
GF(2) i = 1, . . . ,m and not all zeroes. This is equivalent to say Chen et al. (2004):
θˆF(u, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ t, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vm (14)
3.5 Resiliency
Definition 19. f ∈ Fn is a t-resilient function if if it is balanced and t-CI, satisfying: χˆ f (u) =
0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 0 ≤ wt(u) ≤ t. A balanced Boolean function f can be considered as a 0-resilient
function.
Definition 20. F ∈ Fn,m is said to be t-resilient if it is balanced and t-CI, satisfying:
θˆF(u, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 0 ≤ wt(u) ≤ t, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vm (15)
F can also be denoted as an (n,m, t)-resilient. A balanced Vector Boolean function F can be considered
as a 0-resilient function.
3.6 Propagation
Definition 21. Let f ∈ Fn, then f satisfies the propagation criterion of degree l, PC(l)(1 ≤ l ≤ n),
if f (x) changes with a probability of 1/2 whenever i(1 ≤ i ≤ t) bits of x are complemented Preneel
et al. (2006).
Definition 22. F ∈ Fn,m satisfies the PC(l) if any nonzero linear combination of the component
boolean functions satisfies the PC(l):
rF(u, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ l, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vm (16)
4. Criteria for constructions with Vector Boolean functions
In this Section, we address the behavior ofWalsh Spectra, Differential Profiles, Autocorrelation
Spectra and the cited characteristics under several operations of Vector Boolean functions. We
present the known properties without a proof and the new to the best of our knowledge results
appear with their respective proofs.
4.1 Composition of Vector Boolean functions
Let F ∈ Fn,p, G ∈ Fp,m and the composition function G ◦ F ∈ Fn,m.
Theorem 5. The Walsh Spectrum for the composition of two Vector Boolean function can be calculated
from the product of their respective Walsh Spectra in the following way Pommerening (2005):
WS(G ◦ F) =
1
2p
WS(F) ·WS(G) (17)
58 Cryptography and Security in Computing
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Theorem 6. Let F ∈ Fn,m and let LA,b ∈ Fn,n an affine bijection. The Differential Profile for their
composition can be calculated from the product of their respective Differential Profiles in the following
way:
DP(F ◦ LA,b) =
1
2n
DP(LA,b) ·DP(F) (18)
Proof. Taking into account the equality rF◦LA,b (u, v) = rF(Au, v) described in Millan (1998), it
holds that:
δF◦LA,b (u,w) =
1
2n+m ∑w∈Vm rF◦LA,b (u,w)χv(w)
= 12n+m ∑w∈Vm rF(Au,w)χv(w) = δF(Au,w)
Theorem 7. If F is a t-resilient function and G is balanced, then G ◦ F is also a t-resilient function.
Corollary 2. If F is a balanced function, then G ◦ F is also a balanced function.
4.2 Affine bijections of Vector Boolean functions
Let F ∈ Fn,m and let LA,b ∈ Fm,m and LC,d ∈ Fn,n be linear (or affine) bijections.
Lemma 1. From Theorem 5 and Theorem 3 we can conclude that the effect of applying an invertible
linear function before (or after) a function is only a permutation of its columns (or rows). In case it is
an affine bijection, the sign of all the elements of some of its columns (or rows) are changed.
Corollary 3. As a corollary of Lemma 1, we get the following:
∗
max (WS(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d)) =
∗
max (WS(F))
∗
max (DP(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d)) =
∗
max (DP(F))
Corollary 4. The nonlinearity and the linearity distance are invariant under linear (or affine)
bijections of the input space and of the output space, so that Nyberg (1995):
NL(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d) = NL(F) LD(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d) = LD(F)
Here we give alternative proofs as those given by Nyberg in Nyberg (1995) by using corollary
3:
Proof.
NL(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d) = 2n−1 −
1
2
∗
max (WS(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d))
= 2n−1 − 12
∗
max (WS(F)) = NL(F)
LD(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d) = 2n−1 ·
(
1−
∗
max (DP(LA,b ◦ F ◦ LC,d))
)
= 2n−1 ·
(
1−
∗
max (DP(F))
)
= LD(F)
5ryptographic Cri eria o  Vector Boolean Functions
www.intechopen.com
10 Cryptography
Theorem 8. Let F ∈ Fn,m and let LA,b ∈ Fn,n an affine bijection, then F ◦ LA,b satisfies the PC(l) if
and only if F satisfies the PC(l).
Proof. If we use the equality rF◦LA,b (u, v) = rF(Au, v) described in Millan (1998), we can
obtain the following:
F ◦ LA,b satisfies the PC(l)
←→ rF◦LA,b = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ l, ∀ v ∈ Vm
←→ rF(Au, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ l, ∀ v ∈ Vm
←→ rF(u, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ l, ∀ v ∈ Vm
4.3 Adding coordinate functions
Let F = ( f1, . . . , fm1 ) ∈ Fn,m1 , G = (g1, . . . , gm2 ) ∈ Fn,m2 and the function conformed
by adding the coordinate functions (F,G) = ( f1, . . . , fm1 , g1, . . . , gm2 ) ∈ Fn,m1+m2 . Let
v ∈ Vm1+m2 ,vF ∈ Vm1 and vG ∈ Vm2 so that v = vF ⊕ vG.
Theorem 9. The columns of the Walsh Spectrum of the Vector Boolean function constructed by
adding the coordinate functions of two Vector Boolean functions are calculated by the correlation of
their respective columns in the following way:
WS((F,G))v =
1
2n
WS(F)vF ∗WS(G)vG
where WS((F,G))v is the column of the Walsh Spectrum characteristiced by v.
Proof.
θˆ(F,G)(u, v) = χˆvF⊕vG ·(F,G)(u) = W {ξvF ·F  ξvG ·G}(u)
= 12n ∑x∈Vn χˆvF ·F(u + x)χˆvG ·G(x)
Corollary 5. The exact value of the nonlinearity of (F,G) cannot be easily obtained from the knowledge
of the nonlinearities of F and G.
Corollary 6. The columns of both WS(F) and WS(G) are contained in the matrix WS((F,G)).
Corollary 7. From corollary 6 it can be deduced that:
NL((F,G)) ≤ min{NL(F), NL(G)} (19)
The corollary 7 is a generalization of the Theorem 16 in Nyberg (1995). It can be useful, for
instance, to find upper bounds of nonlinearity in S-boxes whose number of output bits is high
by calculating the nonlinearities of shorter S-boxes (see Example 2).
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Example 1. The F-function of the MacGuffin block cipher algorithm consists of the 8 S-boxes of the
DES, but the two middle output bits of each S-box are neglected so that Si(MacG) ∈ F6,2. Let define
the 4-th S-box of DES as S4(DES) = ( f1, f2, f3, f4), then it holds that S4(MacG) = ( f1, f4). If
we denote MacDES the S-box which uses the second and third component functions of DES, then
S4(MacDES) = ( f2, f3). The S-box S4(DES) can be obtained by adding the coordinate functions
which constitute MacDES and aplying a permutation to reorder the coordinate functions. If we want
to obtain the last column of the Walsh Spectrum of S4(DES) from the last columns of the Walsh Spectra
of S4(MacG) and S4(MacDES), then the effect of the permutation can be omitted and the results are
the following:
WS (S4(DES))
(1111) = 126WS (S4(MacG))
(11) ∗WS (S4(MacDES))
(11) (20)
Example 2. The first substitution function of the CAST algorithm Adams & Tavares (1993) , Adams
(1994) denoted by S1 ∈ F8,32 has a nonlinearity of 74 Youssef et al. (1997). If we decompose this Vector
Boolean function into two, taking the first 16 output bits (S1a ∈ F8,16) and the second 16 output bits
(S1b ∈ F8,16) respectively, we can see that the corollary 7 is satisfied:
74 = NL(S1) ≤ min{NL(S1a), NL(S1b)} = min{86, 82} (21)
Theorem 10. If F,G ∈ Fn,n are bijective, F−1 is a t1-resilient function and G−1 is a t2-resilient
function, then the inverse of the Vector Boolean function obtained by adding the coordinates functions
of F and G, denoted by (F,G)−1 ∈ F2n,n is a 2 ·min{t1, t2}-resilient function.
Proof.
F−1 is a t1-resilient function ∧ G−1 is a t2-resilient function
↔ θˆF(v,uF) = 0, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vn, ∀ uF ∈ Vn, 0 ≤ wt(uF) ≤ t1
∧ θˆG(v,uG) = 0, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vn, ∀ uG ∈ Vn, 0 ≤ wt(uG) ≤ t2
↔ θˆ(F,G)−1 (u, v) = 0 ∀ u ∈ V2n, 0 ≤ wt(u) ≤ 2 ·min{t1, t2}, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vn
where u = uF ⊕ uG
Corollary 8. If F,G ∈ Fn,n are bijective, F−1 is a balanced Vector Boolean function and G−1 is a
balanced Vector Boolean function, then the inverse of the Vector Boolean function resulting of adding
the coordinates functions of F and G, denoted by (F,G)−1 is a balanced Vector Boolean function.
Theorem 11. The autocorrelation of the Vector Boolean function resulting by adding the coordinate
functions of two Vector Boolean functions can be expressed in terms of their respective directional
derivatives as follows:
r(F,G)(u, v) =
1
2n ∑x∈Vn (−1)
∆uvF F(x) · (−1)∆uvGG(x)
Proof.
r(F,G)(u, v) =
1
2n ∑x∈Vn (−1)
vF⊕vG(F,G)(x+u)+vF⊕vG(F,G)(x)
= 12n ∑x∈Vn (−1)
vF F(x+u)⊕vGG(x+u)+vF F(x)⊕vGG(x)
= 12n ∑x∈Vn (−1)
vF F(x+u)+vF F(x) · (−1)vGG(x+u)+vGG(x)
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Corollary 9. If u is a linear structure of G, then the autocorrelation of (F,G) is proportional to the
autocorrelation of F:
r(F,G)(u, v) = (−1)
cvG G · rF(u, vF)
where ∆uvGG(x) = cvGG ∀ x ∈ Vn, ∀ vG ∈ Vm2 .
Corollary 10. Let F ∈ Fn,m1 satisfy the PC(l) and let all the vectors in Vn with weight at most l be
linear structures of G ∈ Fn,m2 , then (F,G) ∈ Fn,m1+m2 satisfies PC(l).
Proof. By applying corollary 10:
rF(u, vF) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ l, ∀ vF 
= 0 ∈ Vm1
r(F,G)(u, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn, 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ l, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vm
Corollary 11. If we add coordinates of a Vector Boolean function which satisfies the PC(l) and a Linear
(or Affine) Vector Boolean function then the resulting Vector Boolean function satisfies the PC(l).
Corollary 12. If u is a linear structure of G, then the coefficients of the Differential Profile of (F,G)
is proportional to the coefficients of the Differential Profile of F:
δ(F,G)(u, v) = (−1)
cvG G · δF(u, vF)
Proof.
δ(F,G)(u, v) =
1
2n+m ∑w∈Vm r(F,G)(u,w)χv(w)
= 12n+m1+m2 ∑wF∈Vm1 ∑wG∈Vm2
(−1)cvG G rF(u,wF)χvF (wF)χvG (wG)
= (−1)
cvG G
2n+m1+m2 ∑wG∈Vm2
χvG (wG)∑wF∈Vm1
rF(u,wF)χvF (wF)
= (−1)
cvG G
2n+m1 ∑wF∈Vm1
rF(u,wF)χvF (wF)
4.4 Projection of a Vector Boolean function
Let F = ( f1, . . . , fm) ∈ Fn,m, A = {i1, . . . , im1} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, B = {j1, . . . , jm2} ⊆
{1, . . . ,m},A ∩ B = ∅ so that m = m1 + m2 then F|A = ( fi1 , . . . , fim1 ) ∈ Fn,m1 and
F|B = ( f j1 , . . . , f jm2 ) ∈ Fn,m2 .
Corollary 13. By Theorem 9, it can be demonstrated that the Walsh spectrum of the projection F|A
is obtained by extracting the columns of WS(F) characteristiced by v = (v1, . . . , vm) so that if i ∈ A
then vi = 1 and if i /∈ A then vi = 0.
Theorem 12. The set of vectors where the difference Vector Boolean function of F in the direction of
u ∈ Vn coincides with v ∈ Vm is a subset of the respective set of vectors of F|A.
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Proof. Let v = v|A ⊕ v|B:
DF(u, v) = {x ∈ Vn | F(x + u) + F(x) = v} = {x ∈ Vn | F|A(x + u) + F|A(x) = v|A}
∩ {x ∈ Vn | F|B(x + u) + F|B(x) = v|B} ⊆ DF|A (u, v)
Corollary 14.
∗
max (WS(F|A) ≤
∗
max (WS(F)),
∗
max (DP(F|A) ≥
∗
max (DP(F)).
Corollary 15. NL(F|A) ≥ NL(F), LD(F|A) ≤ LD(F).
Example 3. The F-function of the DES block cipher algorithm consists of 8 S-boxes Si(DES) ∈ F6,4
whose respective nonlinearities and linearity distances are the following:
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NL (Si(DES)) 14 16 16 16 16 18 14 16
∗
max (WS (Si(DES))) 36 32 32 32 32 28 36 32
LD (Si(DES)) = 24, dp (Si(DES)) =
1
4 ∀ i = 1, . . . , 8
MacGuffin’s S-boxes result from restriction of DES S-Boxes, and its characteristics satisfy Corollary
15:
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NL (Si(MG)) 18 18 18 16 20 20 18 20
∗
max (WS (Si(MG))) 28 28 28 32 24 24 28 24
and
LD (S1(MG)) = 15, dp (S1(MG)) = 0.53125
LD (S2(MG)) = 14, dp (S2(MG)) = 0.5625
LD (S3(MG)) = 15, dp (S3(MG)) = 0.53125
LD (S4(MG)) = 16, dp (S4(MG)) = 0.5
LD (S5(MG)) = 16, dp (S5(MG)) = 0.5
LD (S6(MG)) = 18, dp (S6(MG)) = 0.4375
LD (S7(MG)) = 15, dp (S7(MG)) = 0.53125
LD (S8(MG)) = 16, dp (S8(MG)) = 0.5
Corollary 16. By Theorem 9, it can be demonstrated that if F is t-resilient, then F|A is at least
t-resilient.
4.5 Direct sum of Vector Boolean functions
Let n1, n2 ≥ 1, F1 ∈ Fn1,m, F2 ∈ Fn2,m and their direct sum F1 ⊕ F2 ∈ Fn1+n2,m. Let u1 ∈ Vn1 ,
u2 ∈ Vn2 , v ∈ Vm and u = u1 ⊕ u2.
Theorem 13. The elements which conform a row in the Walsh Spectrum of the direct sum of two
Vector Boolean functions are equal to the product of the respective components of the rows in both
Walsh Spectra . The rows of the Differential Profile of the direct sum of two Vector Boolean functions
are obtained by the correlation of the rows of the Differential Profiles of each Vector Boolean function.
θˆF1⊕F2 (u, v) = θˆF1 (u1, v) · θˆF2 (u2, v)
DP(F1 ⊕ F2)u =
1
2m
DP(F1)u1 ∗DP(F2)u2
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The first result was already known for Boolean functions Sarkar & Maitra (2000a), here we
give a proof for Vector Boolean functions.
Proof.
θˆF1⊕F2 (u, v) = χˆv·(F1⊕F2)(u1 ⊕ u2) = χˆv·F1⊕v·F2 (u1 ⊕ u2) = χˆv·F1 (u1) · χˆv·F2 (u2)
The second result is new and the proof is given below:
Proof.
(DP(F1)u1 ∗DP(F2)u2 )(v) = ∑w∈Vm δF1 (u1,w + v) · δF2 (u2,w)
= ∑w∈Vm
1
2n1+m ∑s∈Vm rF1 (u1, s)χw+v(s)
1
2n2+m ∑t∈Vm rF2 (u2, t)χw(t)
= 1
2n1+n2+2m ∑z∈Vm
rF1 (u1, z)rF2 (u2, z)χv(z)
= 12n+2m ∑z∈Vm rF1⊕F2 (u, z)χv(z) =
1
2m DP(F1 ⊕ F2)u(v)
Corollary 17.
∗
max (WS(F1 ⊕ F2)) = max
v∈Vm
{
∗
max (WS(v · F1))·
∗
max (WS(v · F2)} (22)
Corollary 18.
NL(F1 ⊕ F2) = 2n1+n2−1 − 12 maxv∈Vm{(2
n1 − 2NL(v · F1)) (2n2 − 2NL(v · F2))}
Proof.
NL(F1 ⊕ F2) = 2n−1 − 12
∗
max (θˆF1⊕F2 (u, v))
= 2n−1 − 12 maxv∈Vm{
∗
max (θˆF1 (u1, v))·
∗
max (θˆF2 (u2, v))}
= 2n1+n2−1 − 12 maxv∈Vm{(2
n1 − 2NL(v · F1)) (2n2 − 2NL(v · F2))}
This result is a generalization of what is obtained for Boolean functions. Let f ∈ Fn1 , g ∈ Fn2
then f ⊕ g ∈ Fn1+n2 holds that:
NL( f ⊕ g) = 2n1+n2−1 − 12 (2
n1 − 2NL( f )) (2n2 − 2NL(g))
Corollary 19. Let F1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Fi ∈ Fni ,m
NL(F1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Fi) =
= 2n−1 − 12 maxv∈Vm{
∗
max (WS(v · F1)) · · ·
∗
max (WS(v · Fi))}
(23)
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Example 4. The full substitution function of the CAST algorithm S(CAST) ∈ F32,32 is constructed
by forming the direct sum of 4 S-boxes Si(CAST) ∈ F8,32 satisfying:
maxv∈V32{
∗
max (WS (v · S1(CAST)))·
∗
max (WS (v · S2(CAST)))·
∗
max (WS (v · S3(CAST)))·
∗
max (WS (v · S4(CAST)))} = 29417472
(24)
For the exact calculation of the S(CAST) nonlinearity we need to find out the maximum value from
all the elements of a 232 × 232 matrix representing its Walsh Spectrum, or alternatively, to determine
the Walsh Spectra of the 232 linear combinations of its coordinate functions which are 232× 1 matrices.
Nevertheless, by 19, the nonlinearity is obtained by calculating the maximum value of the product of
the maxima values of four Walsh Spectra (28 × 1 matrices) for each of the 232 linear combinations of its
coordinate functions.
NL (S(CAST)) = 232−1 − 1229417472 = 2132774912
lp (S(CAST)) = 4.69127 · 10−5
This result coincides with the estimation of nonlinearity done in Youssef et al. (1997).
Theorem 14. Let F1 be an (n1,m, t1) resilient function and F2 be an (n2,m, t2)-resilient function,
then F1 ⊕ F2 is an (n1 + n2,m, t1 + t2 + 1)-resilient function.
Here we give alternative proof as those given in Zhang & Zheng (1997):
Proof. For all u ∈ Vn1+n2 satisfying wt(u) = t1 + t2 + 1, exists either u1 ∈ Vn1 with wt(u1) =
t1 + 1 and u2 ∈ Vn2 with wt(u2) = t2 so that u = u1 ⊕ u2 or u1 ∈ Vn1 with wt(u1) = t1 and
u2 ∈ Vn2 with wt(u2) = t2 + 1 so that u = u1 ⊕ u2. In both scenarios, it holds that:
θˆF1 (u1, v) · θˆF2 (u2, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn1+n2 , 0 ≤ wt(u) ≤ t1 + t2 + 1, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vm
−→ θˆF1⊕F2 (u, v) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn1+n2 , 0 ≤ wt(u) ≤ t1 + t2 + 1, ∀ v 
= 0 ∈ Vm
Corollary 20. Let F1 anf F2 balanced functions, then F1 ⊕ F2 is an (n1 + n2,m, 1)-resilient function.
This result is an extension of what was obtained in Seberry & Zhang (1993) for Boolean functions.
Theorem 15. The elements which conform a row in the Autocorrelation Spectrum of the direct sum
of two Boolean functions are obtained by the product of the respective components of the rows in both
Autocorrelation Spectra. Let f1 ∈ Fn1 , f2 ∈ Fn2 , then:
r f1⊕ f2 (u) = r f1 (u1) · r f2 (u2)
Proof.
r f1⊕ f2 (u) =
1
2n ∑x∈Vn χ f1⊕ f2 (x + u)χ f1⊕ f2 (x)
= 12n1+n2 ∑x1∈Vn1 ∑x2∈Vn2
χ f1 (x1)χ f2 (x2)χ f1 (x1 + u1)χ f2 (x2 + u2)
=
(
1
2n1 ∑x1∈Vn1
χ f1 (x1 + u1)χ f1 (x1)
) (
1
2n2 ∑x2∈Vn2
χ f2 (x2 + u2)χ f2 (x2)
)
= r f1 (u1) · r f2 (u2)
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Theorem 16. Let f1 satisfies the PC(l1) and f2 satisfies the PC(l2), then f1 ⊕ f2 satisfies the PC(l)
with l = min{l1, l2}. Moreover, it holds that r f1⊕ f2 (u) = 0 for all u = u1 ⊕ u2 with wt(u) =
l1 + l2 + 1 except those which satisfies u1 = 0 or u2 = 0.
Proof. By Theorem 15 we can show:
f1 satisfies the PC(l1) and f2 satisfies the PC(l2)
r f1 (u1) = 0, ∀ u1 ∈ Vn1 , 1 ≤ wt(u1) ≤ l1 and
r f2 (u2) = 0, ∀ u2 ∈ Vn2 , 1 ≤ wt(u2) ≤ l2
r f1 (u1) · r f2 (u2) = 0, ∀ u = u1 ⊕ u2 ∈ Vn1+n2 , 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ min{l1, l2}
−→ r f1⊕ f2 (u) = 0, ∀ u ∈ Vn1+n2 , 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ min{l1, l2}
Besides, for all u ∈ Vn1+n2 satisfying wt(u) = l1 + l2 + 1, exists either u1 ∈ Vn1 with wt(u1) =
l1 + 1 and u2 ∈ Vn2 with wt(u2) = l2 so that u = u1 ⊕ u2 or u1 ∈ Vn1 with wt(u1) = l1 and
u2 ∈ Vn2 with wt(u2) = l2 + 1 so that u = u1 ⊕ u2. In both scenarios, it holds that:
r f1 (u1) · r f2 (u2) = 0, ∀ u = u1 ⊕ u2 ∈ Vn1+n2 , 1 ≤ wt(u) ≤ l1 + l2 + 1
except those where u1 = 0 because r f1 (0) = 1 and r f2 (u2) could be non-zero or where u2 = 0
because r f2 (0) = 1 and r f1 (u1) could be non-zero.
Example 5. Let f1, f2 ∈ F5 which both satisfy PC(2) where f1(x) = x1x2x3x4 + x1x2x3x5 +
x1x2x4x5 + x1x3x4x5 + x2x3x4x5 + x1x4 + x1x5 + x2x3 + x2x5 + x3x4 and f2(x) = x1x2x3x4 +
x1x2x3x5 + x1x2x4x5 + x1x3x4x5 + x2x3x4x5 + x1x4 + x1x5 + x2x3 + x2x5 + x3x4 + x1 + x2 +
x3 + x4 + x5. By Theorem 16 then f1 ⊕ f2 satisfies PC(2).
4.6 Bricklayer of Vector Boolean functions
Let n1, n2,m1,m2 ≥ 1 and F1 ∈ Fn1,m1 , F2 ∈ Fn2,m2 and the Bricklayer function F1|F2 ∈
Fn1+n2,m1+m2 . Let u1 ∈ Vn1 , u2 ∈ Vn2 and u = u1 ⊕ u2, v1 ∈ Vm1 , v2 ∈ Vm2 and v = v1 ⊕ v2.
Theorem 17. The elements which conform the Walsh Spectrum (respect. Differential Profile) of the
Bricklayer of two Vector Boolean functions are obtained by the product of the respective components in
both Walsh Spectra (respect. Differential Profiles).
θˆF1|F2 (u, v) = θˆF1 (u1, v1) · θˆF2 (u2, v2)
δF1|F2 (u, v) = δF1 (u1, v1) · δF2 (u2, v2)
Proof.
θˆF1|F2 (u, v) = χˆ(v1 ,v2)·(F1|F2)((u1,u2)) = χˆv1 ·F1 (u1) · χˆv2 ·F2 (u2)
Proof.
δF1|F2 (u, v) =
1
2n+m ∑w∈Vm rF1|F2 (u,w)χv(w)
= 12n+m ∑w∈Vm rF1|F2 (u1,w)rF1|F2 (u2,w)χv1 (w)χv2 (w)
=
(
1
2n1+m1 ∑w∈Vm rF1|F2 (u1,w)χv1 (w)
) (
1
2n2+m2 ∑w∈Vm rF1|F2 (u2,w)χv2 (w)
)
= δF1 (u1, v1) · δF2 (u2, v2)
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Corollary 21. The Walsh Spectrum (respectively Differential Profile) of the Bricklayer of i Vector
Boolean functions F1| · · · |Fi is equal to the Kronecker products of their Walsh Spectra (respectively
Differential Profiles):
WS(F1| · · · |Fi) = WS(F1) · · ·WS(Fi)
DP(F1| · · · |Fi) = DP(F1) · · ·DP(Fi)
(25)
Corollary 22.
NL(F1|F2) = 2n1+n2−1 − 12 max{2
n1 (2n2 − 2NL(F2)), 2n2 (2n1 − 2NL(F1))}
LD(F1|F2) = 2n1+n2−1 · (1−max{1−
LD(F1)
2n1−1
, 1− LD(F2)
2n2−1
})
Proof. On one hand
NL(F1|F2) = 2n−1 − 12
∗
max (θˆF1|F2 (u, v))
= 2n−1 − 12 max{θˆF1 (u1, v1) ·max(θˆF2 (u2, v2)} where ((u1,u2) 
= 0) ∧ ((v1, v2) 
= 0)
= 2n−1 − 12 max{2
n1 ·
∗
max (θˆF2 (u2, v2)), 2
n2 ·
∗
max (θˆF1 (u1, v1))}
= 2n1+n2−1 − 12 max{2
n1 · (2n2 − 2NL(F2)), 2n2 · (2n1 − 2NL(F1))}
On the other hand
LD(F1|F2) = 2n−1 ·
(
1−
∗
max (δF1|F2 (u, v))
)
= 2n−1 · (1−max{δF1 (u1, v1) · δF2 (u2, v2)}) where ((u1,u2) 
= 0) ∧ ((v1, v2) 
= 0)
= 2n−1 · (1−max{
∗
max (δF1 (u1, v1)),
∗
max (δF2 (u2, v2))})
= 2n1+n2−1 ·
(
1−max
{
1− LD(F1)
2n1−1
, 1− LD(F2)
2n2−1
})
Corollary 23. Let F1| · · · |Fi ∈ Fn,m
dp(F1| · · · |Fi) = max {dp(F1), . . . , dp(Fi)} (26)
The following theorem and corollary are presented without proofs as they are very similar to
the analogous in the previous subsection.
Theorem 18. Let F1 be an (n1,m1, t1)-resilient function and F2 be an (n2,m2, t2)-resilient function,
then F1|F2 is an (n1 + n2,m1 + m2, t1 + t2)-resilient function.
Corollary 24. F1|F2 is an (n1 + n2,m, 1)-resilient function if and only if F1 or F2 are balanced
functions.
Example 6. Let denote S the result of bricklayering all DES S-boxes Si ∈ F6,4 ∀ i = 1, . . . , 8, so that
S = S1| · · · |S8. Thanks to the corollary 22, it is possible to calculate the nonlinearity and linearity
distance of S by calculating the maximum values of the Walsh Spectra and Differential Profiles of the 8
S-boxes. This algorithm deals with eight 26 × 24 matrices instead of one 248 × 232 matrix.
NL(S) = 248−1 − 1236 · 2
42 = 61572651155456
lp(S) = 0.31640625 dp(S) = 14
LD(S) = 248−1 ·
(
1− 14
)
= 3 · 245
As all Si ∈ F6,4 ∀ i = 1, . . . , 8 are balanced S-boxes, then by Theorem 18 it holds that S is an
(48, 32, 7)- resilient function.
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5. Conclusions
In this chapter, several characteristics have been obtained for Vector Boolean Functions which
are constructed using simpler functions combined in different ways. Precisely, the Walsh
Spectrum of the overall function is obtained from the spectra of the functions when they
are combined via composition, addition of coordinate functions, direct sum or bricklayer
construction. In addition, when affine bijections or projection are employed, the maximum
value of the overall Walsh Spectrum is obtained from the maximum values of the involved
elements spectra. These results allow for the computation of nonlinearity, balancedness and
resiliency of the mentioned constructions.
Alternatively, the Differential Profile of the system resulting from the composition with an
affine function, direct sum, or bricklayer is also derived from the Differential Profiles of the
involved elements. Moreover, when affine bijections or projections are employed, bounds on
the maximum value of the Differential Profile for the resulting Function are also obtained.
Therefore, the linearity distance for the cited constructions is computed.
Finally, the Autocorrelation Spectrum of a Vector Boolean Function constructed via affine
bijections of Vector Boolean Functions and direct sum of Boolean functions is provided
from the knowledge of the respective elements Autocorrelation Spectra. Moreover, the
autocorrelation coefficients resulting from adding coordinate functions with linear structures
are obtained. As a consequence, the propagation criterion resulting from the cited
constructions is also provided.
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